Russia is elevating its ties with Southeast Asia as Kuala Lumpur prepares to host several high-level ASEAN events later this month, including the East Asia Summit.

Moscow is promoting its quarter-century relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as a model of cooperation grounded in equality, respect for sovereignty and shared interests—particularly as global power dynamics evolve toward multipolarity.

In a statement ahead of the gatherings, Russia emphasized that it regards ASEAN as a central pillar of the Asia-Pacific order and calls its Dialogue Partner status, first formalized in 1996, a lasting foundation for broad collaboration.

Over time, the relationship has deepened into a Strategic Partnership (designated in 2018), underpinned by a Comprehensive Plan of Action for 2021–2025 across areas such as security, education, culture and economic connectivity.

The statement highlights specific cooperation tracks, including joint counter-terrorism training, youth diplomacy initiatives, and information and communications technology (ICT) dialogues aimed at combating cybercrime and scam call centres.

Russia also reiterates its support for ASEAN’s centrality in regional architecture and reaffirms its commitment to non-coercive, inclusive multilateral frameworks.

As Moscow looks ahead, it is urging ASEAN to adopt expansion of their framework beyond 2025.

Reports indicate that Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov engaged regional counterparts during the July ASEAN foreign ministerial meetings to begin conversations on a successor to the current action plan, with proposed priorities including advanced technologies, digital integration, infrastructure and transregional linkages with institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

Within Southeast Asia, Malaysia is emerging as a focal point of the Russia–ASEAN agenda this year.

As ASEAN chair, Kuala Lumpur has drawn praise from the Russian delegation for steering constructive regional diplomacy and advancing cooperation.

Moscow has also expressed interest in deeper ties with Malaysia, including in areas such as direct air links, trade settlement mechanisms, and legislative alignment on digital and environmental matters.

Observers note that Russia is recalibrating its regional engagement amid pressures from sanctions and shifts in global alignments.

Its greater emphasis on Southeast Asia aligns with ASEAN’s own outlook for diversified, resilience-based diplomacy.

The upcoming summits in Kuala Lumpur may provide Moscow an opportunity to project lasting strategic relevance in the Indo-Pacific just as ASEAN reaffirms its central role in regional governance.

World leaders, government ministers and technology executives are convening in Dubai from October 13 to 17 for GITEX Global 2025, setting an ambitious agenda for the future of artificial intelligence and cybersecurity as central drivers of national strength and resilience.

The 45th edition of the forum positions AI as essential infrastructure, with the United Arab Emirates seeking to export its model of digitally anchored sovereignty to the world.

At the opening ceremony held at the Dubai World Trade Centre, UAE Minister of Economy Abdulla Bin Touq Al Marri affirmed that AI must be treated as a domain of national investment akin to defense.

“Just as nations invest in defense, we must also invest in AI,” he declared, framing AI as integral to sovereignty.

He noted that non-oil sectors now contribute 77.3 percent of the Emirati economy—up from 69 percent five years ago—and aim to reach 80 percent by 2030.

With digital infrastructure and AI dubbed “the backbone of productivity,” the UAE has already deployed an AI-driven trademark registration system that shortens approval times from days to milliseconds.

Minister Al Marri also highlighted talent as “the oil of the new economy,” pointing to initiatives such as the Mohamed bin Zayed University of AI and special long-term visas for digital professionals.

He cast the UAE as a bridge rather than a barrier: “We are not great at building walls; we are great at building bridges.

Use the UAE as your bridge — we connect the world”.

The forum is built around twin themes of digital resilience and sustainable growth.

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development projects that the global AI market could hit US$4.8 trillion by 2033.

Organisers urged deployment of AI in biotech, quantum computing, semiconductors and green data centres.

Meanwhile, the parallel Expand North Star event (October 12–15) showcases startups and investment opportunities; in 2024, the Dubai Chamber of Digital Economy backed over 1,200 startups—up 120 percent year on year.

In this year’s edition, Thai startups including Ample Work, PraIn FinTech, Megenius, Student Care, Digital Era Group and Sable are participating, aiming to generate 180 million baht in trade deals.

Speaking at the launch of Expand North Star, UAE cybersecurity chief Mohamed Al Kuwaiti described cyberdefense as foundational: “Future resilience will belong to nations that make cybersecurity their DNA”.

His call to “Invest, Inspire, Innovate” outlines the country’s strategy to link cybersecurity, AI and quantum research to national development.

Omar Sultan Al Olama, Minister of State for AI, Digital Economy and Remote Work Applications, stressed that technology should not only drive competition but elevate quality of life.

GITEX Global 2025 hosts technology heavyweights—Microsoft, Google, IBM, Huawei, Oracle, Dell, AWS, Siemens—and rising innovators like Cerebras, Qualcomm and Tata Electronics.

The event brings together 6,800 tech firms, 2,000 startups and delegations from 180 countries.

Among the innovations to be showcased is Huawei’s “All Intelligence” suite, featuring cloud, data centre, cybersecurity and smart education solutions.

The UAE is also inaugurating its Stargate AI campus, with the first 200 megawatts expected online in 2026 as part of a broader 5-gigawatt AI infrastructure project being built in collaboration with leading tech firms.

Other announcements include Alibaba Cloud’s launch of its second data centre in Dubai, reinforcing the city’s role as a regional AI hub.

The expansion aligns with the UAE’s broader digital ambitions, even as the AI campus project faces scrutiny due to concerns about access to advanced semiconductors via Chinese-linked entities.

At GITEX, Open Innovation AI is also spotlighting sovereign AI platforms with partners such as Dell, Intel, Cisco and SUSE, designed to give governments and enterprises greater control over data and infrastructure.

As GITEX Global unfolds, Dubai is staging itself not merely as a showcase for next-generation technology, but as a testbed of a future world order where AI, data sovereignty and cyber resilience define strategic power.

A U.S. District Court has ruled that Shenzhen-based DJI must remain on the Pentagon’s list of Chinese companies allegedly linked to Beijing’s military, rejecting the firm’s challenge to its classification under Section 1260H of U.S. law.

The decision constrains DJI’s access to federal programs and underscores Washington’s expansive view of national-security authority.

In its appeal filed this week, DJI sought reversal of a September lower-court finding that its inclusion on the blacklist was legally justified.

The firm had argued it is neither owned nor controlled by the Chinese military, and that its product line focuses on civilian and commercial drones rather than defense systems.

In the earlier lawsuit, DJI described the designation as “unlawful and misguided,” citing damage to its reputation and business relationships.

Judge Paul Friedman’s ruling acknowledged that DJI’s corporate structure does not neatly align with the Department of Defense’s most severe allegations—such as direct Communist Party control—but upheld the designation on a narrower ground.

He found that the government had demonstrated DJI contributes to China’s defense industrial base through “military-civil fusion” mechanisms, including its recognition by the Chinese government as a National Enterprise Technology Center and the receipt of subsidies and preferential tax treatment.

Notably, the judge dismissed several claims from Pentagon arguments as insufficiently evidenced, finding that the Department had conflated industrial zones and overreached in justifying ownership ties.

But the court held that the dual-use nature of DJI’s drone technologies, combined with its government support, falls within the broad discretion afforded to the DoD under Section 1260H.

The ruling does not impose a consumer ban on DJI products in the United States, but it sustains major restrictions on government contracts, grants, loans and program eligibility.

DJI says it is disappointed by the outcome, describing the decision as resting on a singular rationale applied unevenly among private firms, and is reviewing its appellate options.

The case follows a broader U.S. approach toward Chinese tech firms regarding national security risks.

It arrives amid looming import and procurement bans facing DJI under laws such as the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and provisions of the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, which require the company to demonstrate its products pose no unacceptable national security risks by late this year.

With the designation intact, DJI’s operations in its largest foreign market face heightened constraints while the company assesses paths to restore access and defend its standing in U.S. legal and trade systems.

A federal affidavit filed October 13 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia asserts that Ashley Tellis, a prominent Indian-American national security scholar and long-time U.S. adviser, unlawfully retained more than one thousand classified pages—many marked “Top Secret” and “Secret”—which were recovered during a weekend FBI raid on his Virginia residence, including in three trash bags.

The Justice Department contends that Tellis repeatedly removed sensitive documents from secure government facilities and stored them unsecured at his home just outside Washington.

Prosecutors claim that Tellis printed or directed associates to print highly classified materials—some concerning U.S. military aircraft capabilities—on government computers, then transported them in a leather briefcase.

Surveillance video is said to show him leaving State Department and Defense Department buildings with the briefcase on a number of occasions.

The affidavit further alleges that over recent years Tellis met multiple times with Chinese government officials.

At a September 2022 dinner in Fairfax, Virginia, he arrived carrying a manila envelope while Chinese participants entered with a “gift bag”.

The affidavit notes he did not appear to possess the envelope upon leaving, though it does not explicitly accuse him of handing over classified content.

Tellis, age sixty-four, holds a Top Secret security clearance due to his prior work with U.S. foreign policy and defense institutions.

He has served on the National Security Council under President George W.

Bush, worked as a contractor for the Defense Department’s Office of Net Assessment, and since has maintained a high profile as a scholar and adviser in Washington policy circles.

He also holds the Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

He was arrested over the weekend and has been formally charged with unlawful retention of national defense information.

A federal judge ordered that he be held without bail ahead of a detention hearing.

If convicted, Tellis could face up to ten years in prison and a fine of up to $250,000.

His lawyers have signalled readiness to contest the case at the forthcoming hearing.

The arrest has rattled U.S. foreign-policy circles, spotlighting upward scrutiny of how classified material is handled even by veteran insiders.

It also intensifies concerns over Tellis’s Beijing contacts, raising questions about disclosure, oversight, and the boundaries between scholarly engagement and national security risks.

From Sunday, October 12, 2025, the European Union will begin phasing in a new biometric border control regime known as the Entry/Exit System (EES), affecting all non-EU citizens—including British travellers—entering or leaving the Schengen Area.

This long-anticipated system replaces manual passport stamping with digital registration of personal data, facial images, and fingerprints.

On arrival, first-time non-EU entrants will scan their passports and enrol biometric identifiers.

Their date, place of entry, and document type will be recorded digitally.

Upon exit, or in subsequent visits, only facial verification (and passport checks) will typically be required.

Children under age 12 will not be fingerprinted, though they must be photographed and included in the system.

The rollout will be staggered through April 10, 2026, by which date EES must operate at all external Schengen border crossings—airports, ports, rail and road crossings alike.

Until full deployment, passport stamping may continue in some locations.

At UK exit points such as Dover, Folkestone and the Eurotunnel terminal, French border officials will oversee the EES registration.

Initially, only freight and coach passengers will be processed under the new rules; passengers in cars at Dover will undergo checks starting in November, with Eurotunnel vehicle registration expected by the end of 2025.

Authorities stress that the phased introduction is designed to prevent congestion, and allow temporary suspension of checks if necessary.

Nonetheless, the UK government has advised travellers to allow extra time at border crossings, particularly during peak travel periods.

The port and transport sector have voiced concern that delays could ripple into trade flows, especially across the so-called Short Straits sea crossings.

EES aims to modernise border management by tracking compliance with the 90-day stay limit over any 180-day period, combating identity fraud, and detecting overstayers.

The system is built to integrate personal biometric data with movement records while respecting data protection standards.

Looking ahead, EES serves as the foundation for the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), scheduled to launch in late 2026.

Under ETIAS, non-Schengen travellers will be required to apply for pre-travel authorization and pay a €20 fee, valid for three years or until passport expiration.

The phased EES launch will be a key test of the EU’s capacity to modernise mobility while ensuring security and efficiency.

In a striking departure from convention, China’s Ministry of Commerce has recently released policy announcements in a file format that is incompatible with Microsoft Word, requiring users to access them via WPS Office — the home-grown office suite developed by Beijing’s Kingsoft.

The move coincides with Beijing’s decision to expand rare earth export controls amid heightened tensions with the United States.

Observers see this as part of a broader strategic push for software self-reliance—and, possibly, control over document dissemination.

WPS documents use a coding structure that Microsoft’s Word cannot natively open, meaning recipients must convert or use domestic tools to view them.

Critics argue the format choice creates a barrier to transparency and access for foreign stakeholders.

China has long encouraged adoption of domestic technology alternatives in sensitive sectors, especially amid ongoing US-China frictions.

WPS Office has already secured a dominant position within government, financial, and telecommunications spheres, with more than 100 million daily users and over 600 million monthly active users nationwide.

The format shift aligns with China’s ambition to reduce reliance on foreign proprietary technologies.

The timing—during the release of stronger export control measures on rare earths, which are critical to global supply chains in electronics and defense—amplifies the potential impact.

The ministry’s choice to lock the content behind a domestic file standard raises questions over access for foreign firms, analysts, and diplomatic actors.

While China insists its technology policy is grounded in autonomy and sovereignty, this document strategy may also deepen the technological divisions already shaping global economic and regulatory competition.